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The evolution of altruism – costly self-sacrifice in the service of others – has puzzled biologists since The 
Origin of Species1. For half a century, attempts to understand altruism have been built on the insight 
that altruists may help relatives to have extra offspring in order to spread shared genes2. This theory – 
known as inclusive fitness – is founded on a simple inequality termed ‘Hamilton’s rule’2. However, 
explanations of altruism have typically ignored the stochasticity of natural environments, which will not 
necessarily favour genotypes that produce the greatest average reproductive success3,4. Moreover, 
empirical data across many taxa reveal associations between altruism and environmental stochasticity5–
8, a pattern not predicted by standard interpretations of Hamilton’s rule. Here, we derive Hamilton’s 
rule with explicit stochasticity, leading to novel predictions about the evolution of altruism. We show 
that altruists can increase the long-term success of their genotype by reducing the variability in the 
number of offspring produced by relatives. Consequently, costly altruism can evolve even if it has a net 
negative effect on the average reproductive success of related recipients. The selective pressure on 
volatility-suppressing altruism is proportional to the coefficient of variation in population fitness, and is 
therefore diminished by its own success. Our results formalise the hitherto elusive link between bet-
hedging and altruism4,9–11, and reveal missing fitness effects in the evolution of animal societies. 
 
The widespread phenomenon of organisms paying costs to help others (altruism) is a long-standing 
paradox in biology1,2. Recently, variance-averse investment in stochastic environments (bet-hedging) 
has been suggested as an explanation for a number of major puzzles in the evolution of altruism, 
including: (i) the origins of sociality in birds9,11,12, insects13 and rodents14; (ii) the altitudinal distribution 
of eusocial species7; and (iii) the evolution of cooperation between eusocial insect colonies15. The 
global distribution of animal societies is linked to environmental stochasticity4. In birds6,12, 
mammals16, bees7 and wasps8, cooperation is more common in unpredictable or harsh environments. 
However, the effects of stochasticity have largely been omitted from social evolutionary theory. There 
are a handful of notable exceptions: Grafen17 argues that selection will maximise expected inclusive 
fitness under uncertainty; Uitdehaag18 shows that mutualism between nonrelatives could counteract 
kin selection by dampening stochasticity; and Lehmann & Rousset19 explore stochastic effects on 
reproductive value. However, despite speculation11,20, the proposed link between bet-hedging and 
altruism9 has remained elusive4. We resolve this link by presenting a stochastic generalisation of 
Hamilton’s rule (‘stochastic Hamilton’s rule’), which predicts when organisms should pay a cost to 
influence the variance in their relatives’ reproductive success. 
We allow environmental state π to fluctuate among the possible states Π; ‘stochasticity’ is the 
condition that states are unpredictable. We follow the established method of capturing fitness effects 
as regression slopes1. Both the fitnesses wx of individual organisms and the average fitness ?̅? in the 
population may vary among the states Π. We denote the kth central moment of ?̅? as ≪𝑘 ?̅? ≫. The 
joint distribution of the fitness of individual x (wx) and ?̅? across states Π is captured by their mixed 
moments (covariance k=1, coskewness k=2, cokurtosis k=3, etc.; Appendix A1). Altruists may alter not 
only the expected number of offspring (mean, k=0), but may reduce the variation in offspring number 
(variance, k=1) or increase the likelihood of large numbers of offspring (skew, k=2). We denote the 
actor’s effect on the recipient’s expected number of offspring as the benefit bµ, the actor’s effect on 
its own expected number of offspring as the cost cµ, and relatedness as r. Likewise, we denote the 
actor’s effect on the kth mixed moment defining the recipient’s reproductive success as bk, and the 
actor’s effect on the kth mixed moment of its own reproductive success as ck. The stochastic 
Hamilton's rule is therefore: 
   (1) 
Empirical tests of Hamilton’s rule have looked for benefits and costs constituting effects on the 
average reproductive success of recipients and actors, using the form rbµ>cµ (henceforth, ‘means-
based Hamilton’s rule’)21. However, Inequality (1) reveals that bµ is a single component of a spectrum 
of potential benefits of altruism. Conclusions based on mean reproductive success (bµ and cµ) 
overlook effects on the variance of the distribution from which a recipient samples its reproductive 
success. 
Asocial bet-hedging has been analysed extensively3, and is typically described in terms of costs and 
benefits: the cost is a reduction in mean reproductive success, whilst the benefit is a reduction in the 
variance of reproductive success3. Following speculation that these benefits and costs could be 
accrued by different partners9,13 – actors pay costs whilst recipients derive benefits (Fig. 1a) – we refer 
to decoupled benefits and costs as ‘altruistic bet-hedging’. We let bσ and cσ denote, respectively, the 
effects on the recipient and actor’s standard deviation (‘volatility’) in reproductive success (weighted 
by its correlation with population average reproductive success ?̅?; for details see Extended Data 
Table E1). We introduce the ‘stochasticity coefficient’ v as the coefficient of variation in ?̅? across 
environmental conditions (v=
𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
; Fig. 1b). Where the actor can affect both the mean and the 
volatility (but not higher moments) of the recipient’s reproductive success, Inequality (1) simplifies 
(Appendix A2) to: 
r(bµ+vbσ)>cµ+vcσ 
(2) 
Reducing the (?̅?-correlated) volatility in the recipient's number of offspring (bσ>0) confers on 
recipients greater relative fitness in poor environmental states: extra offspring are disproportionately 
valuable when competitors produce few offspring22, underscoring the principle that the ultimate 
currency for benefits and costs under stochasticity is the expectation of relative fitness1. It is 
straightforward to derive the established asocial bet-hedging model3 by setting r=0 (Appendix A3). 
Formally, we define altruistic bet-hedging as a reduction in a recipient’s reproductive volatility 
(positive bσ) that overcomes an otherwise-deleterious cost to the actor’s mean fecundity (positive cµ). 
Strong benefits can arise when bµ and bσ are both positive. Reductions in the actor’s own 
reproductive volatility (cσ<0) diminish total costs (Fig. 2a & b). Moreover, when bσ>cσ, increasing 
stochasticity reduces the minimum relatedness (r) required for altruism to evolve (Fig. 2c). 
Fluctuations in relatedness (r) alter selection only if they correlate with strong fluctuations in 
population average reproductive success (?̅?) (see Appendix A4). 
We note four predictions of the stochastic Hamilton’s rule that differ from standard expectations:   
1. Selection can favour altruism (C>0) with zero increase to the recipient’s mean fecundity (bµ=0). 
Such a seemingly paradoxical lack of benefits is observed where additional helpers appear 
redundant23. Paradoxical helpers can be selected for by reducing the recipient’s reproductive volatility 
if: 
𝑟𝑏𝜎 >
𝑐𝜇
𝜈
+ 𝑐𝜎  
(3) 
2. Actors may be selected to harm the average reproductive success of their relatives (bµ<0, cµ>0). 
The harm is outweighed by a reduction in the recipient’s reproductive volatility (Fig. 2) if: 
𝑟𝑏𝜎 >
𝑐𝜇 − 𝑟𝑏𝜇
𝜈
+ 𝑐𝜎  
(4) 
3. Altruists that reduce their recipients’ reproductive volatility can be favoured by selection in the 
absence of environmental stochasticity, but only when population size (N) is low (in extremely small 
populations3 or small demes with negligible dispersal24). Effects on variance, σ2, not volatility, are used 
here for notational convenience (Appendix A5): 
𝑟 (𝑏𝜇 +
   𝑏𝜎2
𝑁𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
) > 𝑐𝜇 +
𝑐𝜎2
𝑁𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
 
(5) 
4. Very strong altruistic effects (bσ ≫ 0) can undermine the success of the altruist genotype (Extended 
Data Fig. E1; Appendix B1–4). Altruists that substantially reduce their recipients’ reproductive 
volatility spread rapidly. As successful altruists reach high frequencies, the coefficient of variation in 
average reproductive success (v = 
𝜎𝜋[?̅?]
𝔼𝜋[?̅?]
) tends towards zero (Extended Data Fig. E2). When v is small, 
any bσ has a small effect (Inequality (2)), so altruistic bet-hedgers undermine the condition (high v) 
that favoured them (Extended Data Fig. E1a&b). This frequency-dependence can generate 
polymorphisms of altruists and defectors (Extended Data Fig. E1c), provided that allele frequency 
does not fluctuate intensively, which can otherwise destabilise the equilibrium (Extended Data Fig. E3) 
and lead to fixation25. 
Apparent reduction of recipient reproductive volatility (implying bσ>0) has been shown in starlings
9, 
sociable weavers26, woodpeckers10, wasps27, and allodapine bees13. We illustrate a volatility-reduction 
route to sociality with two examples. First, we consider sister–sister cooperation in facultatively-social 
insects (as in certain carpenter bees, where a means-based Hamilton’s rule is violated28). In strongly 
stochastic environments, altruism can evolve between haplodiploid sisters when values of mean 
fecundity alone would predict it to be deleterious, as predicted by Inequality (2) (Fig. 3a) and 
simulations of haplodiploid populations (Fig. 3b; Appendix C1). Second, using published estimates of 
mean fecundity and high stochasticity in Galapagos mockingbirds (Mimus parvulus), we indicate how 
volatility effects could favour cooperative breeding even if helping increases the recipient’s average 
fecundity only as much as it reduces the actor’s (cµ=bµ; Fig. 3c; Appendix C2). 
Inequality (2) reveals three core conditions for altruistic bet-hedging. First, members of the non-
altruistic genotype suffer synchronous fluctuations in lifetime reproductive success driven by 
environmental state (high v) that can be stabilised by sociality (bσ>0). Second, relatedness (r) is above 
the threshold r*=
𝑐𝜇+𝑣𝑐𝜎
𝑏𝜇+𝑣𝑏𝜎
. Third, actors either cannot predict environmental fluctuations or cannot 
generate phenotypes for different conditions (Fig. 4; Appendix B5). If actors can obtain and utilise 
information at sufficiently low costs (rendering the environment predictable), plastic cooperation 
outcompetes constitutive cooperation (increasing bµ and reducing cµ). 
Synchronous fluctuations (high v) are generated when different patches within the population 
experience correlated environmental changes (Fig. 1b; Appendix A6). If offspring disperse across 
environmentally uncorrelated patches3 but compete at a whole-population level, v falls. Likewise, 
iteroparity and long generations across different environmental conditions reduce v, whilst correlated 
exposure to environmental conditions within lifetimes increases v. For these reasons, Inequality (2) 
suggests that the most promising avenues to detect bσ-driven sociality may occur among social 
microbes, which can experience: (i) population-wide fluctuations (high v); (ii) short generations (high 
v); (iii) competing clones (high r); and (iv) opportunities to confer homeostasis on others (bσ>0), 
including through the construction of biofilms29 and incipiently-multicellular clusters withstanding 
profound abiotic and biotic stress. 
We have shown that altruistic effects on recipient volatility are visible to selection. Significantly, 
Hamilton’s rule identifies ultimate payoffs by incorporating any effects of population structure1. To 
make case-specific predictions, researchers should, accordingly, utilise explicit information on 
population structure and ecology. The empirical challenge to detect volatility-suppressing sociality in 
wild organisms will best be met using tailored models guided by field data for specific scenarios, led 
by the general framework of inclusive fitness theory1,21,30. In summary, Hamilton’s rule reveals the 
action of selection under stochasticity: shielding relatives from a volatile world can drive the evolution 
of sociality. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1 | Environmental stochasticity has been missing from models of social evolution. In the non-stochastic application of 
Hamilton’s rule to real-world organisms
21
 (rbµ>cµ), recipients gain an increase in average reproductive success (bµ>0) whilst 
actors suffer a decrease in average reproductive success (cµ>0). (Panel a) We formalise an explicitly-stochastic Hamilton’s 
rule: r(bµ+vbσ)>cµ+vcσ. This shows that benefits can also arise by reducing the volatility of the recipient’s reproductive 
success (bσ>0), which depends on the magnitude of environmental stochasticity (v). An increase in the actor’s reproductive 
volatility (cσ>0) imposes a cost on the actor. Each effect represents a transformation of a probability distribution for 
reproductive success (lower element of panel). Total benefits and costs (B and C) are measured in expected relative fitness
1
. 
(Panel b) Environmental stochasticity (v) is highest when spatial patches fluctuate in sync: for instance, if drought affects a 
randomly-chosen patch Z, it should be likely that it also affects a randomly chosen patch Y (Appendix A6). Here, following 
Starrfelt & Kokko
3
, we represent patches in a lattice connected by dispersal. Colours denote environmental condition on 
patches at sequential time-points t. See Appendix A. Wasp: © Z. Soh. 
 
Figure 2 | Increased stochasticity can increase the potential for selection of altruistic behaviour. Without stochastic effects, 
altruism evolves when rbµ>cµ (shown in region ‘1’ in panels a and b for cµ=1, and r=0.5). As stochasticity v rises, the power of 
bσ:cσ benefits increases, reducing the ratio of bµ:cµ needed for the evolution of altruism. In (Panel a) altruists secure a high 
bσ=0.75, considerably increasing the scope for altruism (extending region ‘1’ to region ‘2’). Actors may also reduce the 
volatility of their personal fecundity (here, cσ=–0.4), reducing the magnitude of the total cost C below cµ and increasing the 
potential for altruism further (extending to region ‘3’). Altruism is always deleterious in region ‘4’. In (Panel b), altruists 
secure a low bσ=0.1 and personal volatility reduction of cσ=–0.1 (regions as in panel a). Comparing panel a (bσ=0.75) and 
panel b (bσ=0.1), larger reductions of recipient volatility (higher bσ) result in larger increases in the actor’s inclusive fitness. 
(Panel c) The minimum relatedness required for the evolution of altruism under different cµ values (curved lines, from 
cµ=0.05 to 0.4, when bσ=0.75, cσ=0, and bµ=0.2); as stochasticity (v) increases, the minimum required relatedness (r*) 
decreases.  
 
Figure 3 | Empirical studies of Hamilton’s rule may benefit from incorporating stochasticity. (Panel a) Here, we model sister–
sister cooperation between facultatively-social insects: volatility effects can drive the invasion of altruists in regions of 
parameter space (below the dashed line) in which the means-based Hamilton’s rule (rbµ>cµ) is violated. (Panel b) These 
predictions are matched in an individual-based haplodiploid simulation. In both panels a and b, good and bad years occur 
equally (dπ=0.5) at random. In Appendix B, we discuss temporal correlation. Coordinates plot average frequency across five 
replicate simulations after 1,000 generations, from an initial frequency p=0.05. (Panel c) In high-stochasticity conditions, 
helpers may buffer breeders from profound environmental fluctuations
4,9,11
. We estimate rbµ values in the Galapagos 
mockingbird (Mimus parvulus), and show that volatility effects can, in principle, drive cooperation (above the dashed line) 
even when mean fecundity costs cµ cancel out bµ (here, bµ=cµ=0.3). See Appendix C. Bee: K. Walker (CC-BY 3.0 AU); 
Mockingbird: BHL (CC-BY 2.0). 
 
Figure 4 | The trade-off between constitutive and inducible altruism in a stochastic world depends on plasticity costs and 
information reliability. We show a population fluctuating randomly between a good and a bad environmental state, 
comprised of three alleles: ‘selfish’ (S) whose carriers never cooperate; ‘constitutive cooperator’ (C) whose carriers always 
cooperate; and ‘inducible cooperator’ (I) whose carriers only cooperate when they believe they are in the bad (low-
fecundity) state. Information reliability is set by A (actors diagnose true state with probability A). Apexes represent 
monomorphic populations. Without social behaviour, individuals obtain 4 and 1 offspring in good and bad states 
respectively. Cooperation confers on recipients 1.5 additional offspring in bad states but reduces recipient fecundity by 0.2 
offspring in good states, and costs actors 0.5 offspring in all states. (Panel a) Only considering mean fecundity, the means-
based Hamilton’s rule rbµ>cµ, commonly used empirically, mistakenly predicts that selfishness (S) will dominate. In stochastic 
conditions cooperation evolves: (Panel b) constitutive cooperators invade (to polymorphism) when information is imperfect 
(A=0.75) and there is a plasticity cost (0.1 offspring). (Panel c) When information reliability is increased (A=1), plastic 
cooperators outcompete constitutive cooperators. (Panel d) However, increasing plasticity costs (here, from 0.1 to 0.3 
offspring) eliminates plasticity benefits, allowing constitutive cooperators to invade. Vectors show directions of expected 
changes in frequencies: these represent continuous expected trajectories when frequencies are constrained to change by 
small amounts per generation. Relatedness r=0.5 in all plots. Details are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Extended Data Table E1 | Parameters of the model. For derivation of regression slopes, see Appendix A. 
 
Extended Data Figure E1 | The interaction between the frequency of altruists and the effectiveness of altruism. (Panel a) The 
stochastic Hamilton’s rule predicts that selection on volatility-suppressing altruism with fixed costs and benefits can 
generate negative frequency-dependence and is sensitive to mild mean-fecundity costs (cµ). We evaluate a population 
undergoing synchronous fluctuations to identify the frequency p* at which there is no expected change in allele frequency. 
We illustrate the result with individual fecundities of 4 and 1 in good and bad years respectively. Relatedness is r = 0.5. 
(Panel b) Simulated population outcomes (frequency after 100,000 generations) match predictions of the stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule in panel a. Warmer colours denote higher polymorphic frequencies of altruists. In this haploid model 
(Appendix B), 1% of breeding spots are available each year for replacement by offspring that year: with such constraints on 
the magnitude of the response to selection, radical stochastic shifts in allele frequency over single generations do not occur, 
allowing the population to settle at equilibria where all alleles have equal expected relative fitness without being continually 
displaced (Extended Data Fig. E3). (Panel c) Competing an altruistic allele against a defector allele reveals the action of 
frequency dependent selection. Here, populations experiencing costs of c = 0.2 and η = 0.466 converge to p
*
 = 0.359 from 
any initial frequency (coloured lines show five starting frequencies from 0.001 to 0.999), as predicted by the stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule. 
 
Extended Data Figure E2 | Stochasticity v =
(𝑝𝜂+(1−𝑝))𝜎00
𝜇00−𝑝𝑐
 for the model of altruistic bet hedging in Appendix B 
(Supplementary Information) plotted against frequency (p) and cost (c) for three different values of η (where lower values of 
 10 
η denote greater buffering of recipients from the environment). (Panels a and b) When η is small, representing high levels of 
volatility reduction, v declines steeply with p across the range of costs. When η is large (Panel c), the sign of the effect of p on 
v depends on c. Values of other parameters: z1 = 4, z2 = 1, d = 0.5. 
 
Extended Data Figure E3 | Weak selection negates the capacity of temporal autocorrelation to drive the frequency of altruistic 
bet-hedgers away from the convergence frequency. All panels show individual-based simulations from five different initial 
frequencies of an altruistic bet hedging allele (p) competing against a non-cooperator. In panel a, the population has zero 
temporal autocorrelation (environmental state in each generation is random). In panel b, the population has strong 
temporal autocorrelation (environmental state in the next generation has a 90% probability of remaining the same as in the 
current generation). Despite higher amplitude fluctuations, this population converges to the same point (from the five 
different starting frequencies) as the uncorrelated population (panel a). In panel c, the same population is simulated with 
greater gene frequency changes (10% of the resident genotype frequencies are available to change each generation). The 
population is repeatedly carried to frequencies far from the convergence point. In this case, the utility of the stochastic 
Hamilton’s rule is (i) identifying whether a given trait is immune from invasion by competitors and (ii) identifying the 
expected generational change at each frequency 𝑝. Parameters are 𝑧1 = 4, 𝑧2 = 1, 𝛼 = 0.5.  
